as a hint—obscure, indeed; but not utterly valueless—that perhaps in this ceremony lurks a relic of an old human sacrifice to the Spirit of the Waters."

Another merit of the book, to be appreciated especially by non Greek-speaking readers, is the author's translation of the folksongs abounding in his book in verse. The texts of the songs are also given in the original, so that a reader with some knowledge of Greek may grasp the beauty of the poetry. He can also check at any time the faithfulness of the author's translation, which, however, can resist the severest criticism. We could say, I suppose, that the poetical part of the book deserves to be commented especially. The author, of course, had already proved that he was very familiar with Modern Greek folk poetry, having published in 1900 his *Songs of Modern Greece* (with Introduction, Translation and Notes). In that book, however, he had not yet ventured a translation of the songs in verse, as he did three years later in his *Macedonian Folklore*.

The author's mastery of the Greek language, both in its ancient and modern forms, is attested not only by his translations of the folksongs, but especially by his translation of texts extremely difficult to understand, on account of the peculiarly mixed language into which they are written, such as the "Useful Medical Treatise" (pp. 230-235) from a manuscript of the 18th century, and two charms dating from the same time (pp. 239-240, 363-364). These are also given in the original in the Appendixes to the book.

The classical studies' background of the author, his access to a flourishing traditional culture, and his feeling for associating the right things in the puzzle of comparativism, justify from every respect the reprinting of his *Macedonian Folklore* by the Institute for Balkan Studies.

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It is often in small incidents that pass unnoticed that the greater
design of foreign policy is revealed. And since such policy is framed but not guided chiefly by ideology, geographic and other pragmatic factors being of greater weight, it is more often than not that history repeats itself. Thus, a study of areas of pre-Soviet interest by present-day "Kremlinologists" is quite rewarding.

One peg of Tsarism's Near Eastern policy was the tie of the Orthodox Church which Russia's masses shared with segments of the peoples of the area—a tie which the officially atheist Soviet Union has at times attempted to reconstitute, particularly in Syria but elsewhere as well. Not too long ago, it was announced that the Russian Orthodox Church may once more send monks to the vast but presently depleted and devastated Russian monastery on Mt. Athos (Panteleimon or "Rossikon").

In the context of current events, therefore, the past has much to reveal and instruct. Such in the history of the "Georgian Question" first raised in 1868 and terminated only by the collapse of the Russian monarchy.

Briefly, the affair appeared to be a resurgence of an ancient claim by a community of Georgian monks upon the monastery of "Iverikon", founded by Georgians but for centuries entirely Greek. In actuality however, whether originally by intent or not, the affair became a ploy of the Russian Foreign Ministry and its envoys in Constantinople for expansion of Russian influence in the monastic center of Eastern Orthodoxy, not unconnected with similar Russian aims in Palestine and with Tsarist Pan-Slavism generally.

Professor Tachiaos, a member of the theological faculty of the University of Thessaloniki appears to be in excellent command of hard-to-reach original sources in Athonian monasteries in both Russian and Greek which support this view of what at first sight seems to be an obscure monks' quarrel. When we learn through these otherwise unpublished documents as well as through other unimpeachable sources that Russia's diplomatic representatives in their official capacity were actively involved, the wider implications are laid bare and should constitute a warning in the present when and if similar maneuvers are attempted by the Tsars' heirs.

Unfortunately, the work appeared without notice seven years ago and, perhaps because it is written in modern Greek with only a brief German synopsis, it has continued to pass unnoticed. This is a pity and a loss to serious study of Russian history and policies which either its
publishers, the Institute of Balkan Studies, should rectify or another competent English translator should undertake.
An English or American edition would be a valuable gain.

New York

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War, according to Clausewitz, is the achievement of national policy by other means. But war which is equated only with violence, international law teaches us, is a misconception. The state of war is essentially a legal condition and accordingly there can be war and no violence or there can be great violence and no war. Indeed, the use of force in inter-state relations, generally considered to be a legitimate monopoly of the state, has time and again been assumed by individuals or groups within the nation state. The actions of these individuals or groups has often forced the state, against its better judgment, if not its wishes, to become involved in the international sphere in actions that it would ordinarily have avoided.

Professor Dakin's study—especially of the Greek side—of the Macedonian struggle in the period before the first World War is an excellent example of how private individuals or groups have by their actions, both in the field of combat and at home, influenced and decided the policies not only of their own government, but also those of the Great Powers.

The struggle for Macedonia was essentially the Greek and Serbian response to the Bulgarian attempt to acquire the area and thus enlarge the borders of the Bulgarian state. The principal Bulgarian instrument in this campaign was the Internal Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) whose cry of "Macedonia for the Macedonians" was acceptable in Sofia, for Macedonian autonomy would merely be a mid-way point to be followed, as in the case of Eastern Rumelia, by a unification with Bulgaria.

Defeated in their war with Turkey in 1897 and enmeshed in the Cretan question the Greek Government was really in no position to pick up the Bulgarian challenge and get deeply involved in the Macedonian struggle in the late 1890's. Such, however, was not the case in Macedonia itself where armed resistance to the IMRO-led comitadji bands was initially