The well-known scholar Evangelos Kofos, an expert on Balkan affairs and history, has published at the end of 1989 two essays dealing with the impact of the Macedonian Question on the civil conflict in Greece, 1943-49, one in Greek and one in English. The author analyses the dangers to which Greek Macedonia and Greek Thrace were exposed in the years 1943-49. The latter were due to Tito's expansionist policy and are connected with those incurred by the Bulgarian occupation of Eastern Macedonia and of Thrace, where the Germans invited them in 1941 and where they remained until the end of 1944. It has to be stressed that Greece did not lose the areas of Macedonia and of Thrace it held at the beginning of World War II thanks to the efforts of the United Kingdom and of the United States which were able to impose their views on the Soviet Union. The author tries to prove that the Greek Communist Party was not, after 1935, willing to abandon those Greek areas and mentions decisions which were useful in this connection for the interests of Greece. The author further supports that German tendencies to expand the Bulgarian zone of occupation were abandoned when the unanimous Greek opposition became felt. At the same time the author admits that the collaboration of the Athens Quisling Government to this move was not without any utility.

The two essays give a lot of information based on all sources published until now and mention those unpublished. I believe that the advantage for the reader would have been greater if the author did divide the content of the two books in a systematic way, either by year or on the basis of any other criterium, as for instance the evolution of the expansionist Bulgarian policy, or the aims of Tito, or the repercussions of the forecasts of the impending German defeat, or the development of Balkan and Greek politics. Independently of this reserve the author is perfectly right when stressing that the developments in Northern Greece were caused by the initiative and by the decisions of foreign powers and particularly of the three Great Powers which were able to limit and to direct both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in their expansionist policy, as Greece had certainly no reason to raise the question to which country these areas were to be incorporated. The author does not ignore the contribution in this connection of the policy of the Greek Government in the appropriate direction and of the will of the Soviet Union in connection with the Straits, particularly after the discord between Yugoslavia and the Soviet-led Cominform which started in 1948. On the other hand the author analyses the vain efforts of Bulgaria, after the change of régime on September 9, 1944, to keep Greek Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, whilst willing to abandon the Yugoslav areas occupied by the Bulgarians in 1941-44.