a definition of "student". Neither is provided. This is not merely a bad book, it is a dishonest book written to support an ideological position and has no place in a scholarly collection. If it has a single virtue it is that its high price ($11.95) may discourage purchase.

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This volume is a collection of seventeen papers which were among those read at a symposium on "The Interaction between Jews and the Peoples of East-Central Europe, 1918-1945" at Haifa University, May 1-4, 1972. As such, they are varied aspects of a common theme on Jewish relations with non-Jews in several European countries. More deal with Hungary than any other state, although there are contributions on Romania, Poland, Slovakia, the Soviet Union, and Lithuania. The two principal themes of the papers are the variety of attitudes and responses that Jews held in alien societies ranging from assimilation to defiant nationalism and sectarian particularism and the variations of anti-Semitism among the non-Jews throughout the region.

As it would be difficult and not instructive to comment on all the papers, I shall limit my remarks to several individual essays which have struck chords of particular personal interest. By this I do not mean in any way to denigrate the quality or importance of any contribution not included.

Since one underlying conclusion throughout the volume is that even assimilation did not help the Jews to avoid the horrors of the Nazi holocaust (p. xiv), the space devoted to Hungary — the east-central European country where Jewish assimilation was reputed to be the most successful — is not surprising. The Hungarian essays begin with an excellent study by George Berany of the University of Denver. This is the longest single article in the entire collection, and is entitled "'Magyar Jew or Jewish Magyar?' Reflections on the Question of Assimilation". In it Barany examines the realities of assimilation in the central European state; and concludes that the process was indeed a powerful, if not homogenous, force among the different sections of the Jewish community. However, Barany thinks the forms of assimilation were subtle and complex. He emphasizes that assimilation was not just Magyarization, for there "was as yet (after 1867) no firmly shaped Hungarian culture into which one could assimilate" (p. 65). Furthermore, many Hungarian Jews began seeking alternatives to assimilation in the years before World War II (p. 84). Several of the authors note that Jews embraced the whole political spectrum. This conclusion picks up a theme of editor Vago, who in an introductory paper, "The Attitude toward the Jews as a Criterion of the Left-Right Concept", points out that between the wars attitudes towards Jews in central and eastern Europe were often clues indicating position on the political spectrum; however, in fact, Jews held the complete range of political views and were in all parties except those on the anti-Semitic right. At the same time elements of anti-Semitism could be found throughout the left-right continuum as well. In Hungary even though after 1920 the anti-Semitic right identified the Jews entirely as allies of the Communist leader Bela Kun, there were in fact Jews who participated in the anti-Communist counter-revolution that ousted Kun, as well as Jews who served in bourgeois and aristocratic cabinets.

Three of the Hungarian essays are contributed by Hugh Seton-Watson, Charles A. Macartney, and Randolph Braham, certainly among the best known specialists on Eastern Europe.
Each in part or entirely directs himself to the reasons for the holocaust in Hungary, but major points are in dispute. While Braham places primary responsibility on Admiral Miklos Horthy, Macartney excuses the regent. Macartney and Seton-Watson, both writing from conservative points-of-view, differ on the precise class basis of anti-Semitism and its prevalency among the bourgeoisie. Macartney thinks this was very great, while Seton-Wastson attributes middle class Hungarian anti-Semitism to recent, almost superficial causes in the twentieth century.

Ezra Mendelsohn of Hebrew University has an outstanding contribution on Jewish politics in Poland during the interwar period, showing not only the diversity among Jews for religious and political reasons, but also their differing attitudes toward Polish parties. Jewish response ranged from attempts at accommodation and assimilation to Zionism, autonomy, and orthodox particularism. The Polish tragedy, according to Mendelsohn, was highlighted by the attempts of the Jews to seek a modus vivendi with the Pilsudski government as preferable to the more blatant anti-Semitism of the regimes of the Polish Democrats. However, even the Marshall and his successors demonstrated political hostility toward the Jews; which, despite the initial efforts of the Jewish leader, especially among the Orthodox party, to explain it away, they eventually had to confront.

In another fine contribution Yeshajahu Jelenik (University of Haifa) deals with the variety of Roman Catholic responses to the holocaust in Slovakia. He shows that there was a basic division between the attitudes of the Papal Curia and the national Slovakian clergy. The former disapproved strongly of Slovakian anti-Jewish measures which Jelenik attributes to a considerable degree to international considerations and matters of appearance. The Slovakian clergy, however, was divided. Some priests genuinely opposed the anti-Semitic policies and others at least were uncomfortable with them. Yet many priests, including most of the national hierarchy, acquiesced, in some cases enthusiastically, in the measures against the Jews. This ambivalent situation impeded the Final Solution, but in the end did not prevent it. Jelenik places a large part of the blame on the president of the republic, Father Josef Tiso.

Finally, the eminent American scholar Stephen Fischer-Galati, attempts to prove in his paper that anti-Semitism played only a minor role in Romania’s political history. At one point he states that “the Jewish Question in Romania was infinitely less significant in the history of fascism and persecution than almost anywhere else in Europe” (p. 168). In another place he states that “the Jews of Romania fared infinitely better than those of other countries in Nazi-occupied Europe; and it is a tribute to (Ion) Antonescu and to the Romanian population at large that the Romanian Jews alone (italics supplied) were saved from the physical extermination through the ‘Final Solution’ which was dictated by Hitler and his henchmen during the later stages of the War” (p. 171). This contention certainly flies in the face of the prevalent opinion that Romania was one of the most anti-Semitic countries of modern Europe.

Unfortunately, neither Professor Fischer-Galati’s evidence nor an examination of the facts warrants his rash conclusions. On the lack of anti-Semitism as an element of fascism in the country, Fischer-Galati is using a broad definition of fascism to include not only the admittedly anti-Semitic Iron Guard and Christian Legion, but also the royal dictatorship of King Carol. If the king’s anti-Semitism was indeed less than that of Nazi-style organizations, nevertheless, we cannot overlook that the governments of other such leaders in the Balkans, e.g., Bulgaria’s Boris, Yugoslavia’s Alexander, Greece’s Metaxas, would fit this mode of ‘fascism’ while at the same time being less anti-Semitic than the Romanian variety. In Europe at large the lack of anti-Semitism in Italian fascism of the thirties is well known. Rather than showing absence of anti-Semitism before the end of World War II, modern Romanian history is filled with incidents and movements based in large part on hostility toward the Jews. The
fact that other motives could explain these phenomena, e.g., economic repression in 1907; irredentist feelings after 1918, does not eliminate the reality of anti-Semitism, which almost everywhere manifests hostility toward the Jews, masking other underlying social and economic problems.

Fischer-Galati’s statement on the holocaust is imprecise as well. It is true that Marshall Antonescu was not the anti-Semite that Corneliu Codreanu and Octavian Goga were, but the escape of the Regat Jews from the holocaust was due mainly to events in the course of the war. Precisely the same situation occurred for the same reason in neighboring Bulgaria, where all Jewish citizens escaped the Final Solution (thus the Romanian events were not unique!) and where anti-Semitism was indeed a minimal factor. We may well add that Romanian soldiers participated in the killing of Jews in the Ukraine with such brutality that even accompanying SS officers commented unfavorably. Theodor Lavi in the contribution which follows Fischer-Galati’s essay gives a much more reasonable explanation of why the Romanian Jews were not deported, noting both the war and internal protests. Indeed Fischer-Galati’s concluding statement that today “the Jews of Romania have never been better off” (p. 174) contradicts his implication that they really never had it that bad in the past.

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The final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, contained three principal provisions, which have come to be identified as baskets: Basket One, a declaration of principles and a series of measures designed to build confidence in military relations; Basket Two, provisions for commercial and scientific cooperation; and Basket Three, humanitarian issues. King and Dean and their collaborators, all but three of whom are present or former employees of Radio Free Europe, published this volume just as the CSCE was getting under way. The quality of the essays, which concentrate, as might be expected, on the matters treated in the first two baskets, is reasonably even and higher than one might expect of a collection of this kind. Most draw on RFE’s careful monitoring of the East European press and air waves and therefore stay close to their subjects. Whatever RFE’s political motivations may be, and one of them is surely to persuade scholars of the organization’s credibility, the result in this case is a generally useful collection of materials by which to judge what is still three years later an unresolved moment in East-West relations.

If there is a single theme running through the ten chapters in this book, it is the relationship between détente and the internal political order, either of a given state or expressed in terms of inter-state relations within Eastern Europe. It is a theme to which we return on the eve of the follow-up to CSCE in Belgrade, at a time when human rights have gained prominence equal to that accorded by King and Dean, along with most other observers, to military and economic questions.

In their introduction, King and Dean write,

“‘In the five years since the Czechoslovak reformist experiment was aborted by the Soviet Union, the Western approach to Eastern Europe has undergone a fundamental change. Western policy has now turned away from the assumption that an evident, if