ever, is not at all surprising. Many in the area did not either — and many western statesmen, including American officials, have not appeared to understand it even in the 1970’s.

Dr. Helmreich’s work is based on a wealth of archival and pertinent published materials, as his extensive bibliography and his copious notes well testify. It is very well written and deserves a very wide reading, not only for what he has to say about the processes of peacemaking in the period of 1919-1920 but about the substantive issues involved.

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As Professor Jelavich remarks at the very outset of her study, each succeeding conflict over the so-called Eastern Question during the Nineteenth Century found the Ottoman Empire as the clearcut loser. The Ottoman Empire, now decrepit, had to defend itself against the rising tide of Balkan nationalism, while later it fought a losing battle, in different circumstances, against Arab and even Turkish nationalism. At the intercontinental crossroads of Eurasia and Africa, it was attacked by European states with designs against the territorial integrity and political independence of the Empire.

Mrs. Jelavich deals primarily with the relationships of the Ottoman Empire with the European Powers — France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. The problem of the Straits is examined in connection with the London Black Sea Conference of January-March 1871, which, on Russian demand, essentially reaffirmed the principles governing passage of the Straits, enshrined in the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856), but lifted the restrictions on Russian warships in the Black Sea, under a program of pseudo-neutralization.

The second part of the volume covers the fate of the settlement in London and the varied interpretations given to it in the period prior to 1887. It discusses the principal episodes in the years following 1871, including the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), the Congress of Berlin (1878) and the Salisbury declaration, and comes down to the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887. As the author well notes the question of the Straits — a very important problem during the period covered — remained a major factor in international relations, and the London agreement was only succeeded by the settlement at Lausanne of July 24, 1923. The London agreement provided the best settlement for the Sublime Port — closure of the Straits to foreign warships, with the exception that in a period of emergency the Sultan could summon the help of «friendly and allied powers». This was the kind of settlement which the Sublime Porte sought to maintain. The volume closes with a postscript on the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909.

This is a well-written, well-balanced and objective account which adds much to the picture of the problem of the Turkish Straits which should command the attention of all students of this fascinating question. It should also serve as a setting for later developments and it is most especially useful in putting Russian policy in appropriate perspective, granted the myths and legends which have been built up in that connection.

Mrs. Jelavich’s volume should be on all reference shelves dealing with the problem of the Straits. It may well be read in association with late Philip E. Mosely’s *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question, 1838-1839* (1934), the more recent documentary volume of M. S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1871* (1923), and the recently republished volume of James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, *Turkey at the Straits:
A Short History (1940). Meanwhile, the problem remains and one may bear in mind that, after all, «What's past is prologue».

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Peter Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (The Johns Hopkins University Press, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1972, pp. 144, Translated from the German by S. F. Young.

This paperback by a reporter of the West German newspaper Westdeutsche Rundfunk attempts to portray to western readers the European scene as viewed by the people and governments of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Much of what he writes is not new; the western man on the street has at least a vague notion of how the allurements of his living standards and personal liberties threaten the stability of communist dictatorships by force of living example. Bender, however, without in any way apologizing for the shortcomings of the aforementioned regimes, writes so cogently that even the general reader comes to appreciate the viewpoint of the «other side».

Perhaps Bender's greatest contribution is his emphasis on how the various Warsaw Pact nations differ from each other in virtually every way, and how the attitude of the USSR differs towards each in turn. While historical background plays some part in these considerations other factors such as geography (especially as regards proximity to NATO nations and/or to the USSR), degree of industrial development, and the state of international solidarity at any given time are probably more important.

The source materials are mostly political speeches and press articles most of which are in German but which also include a few in Czech and Polish. He seems to rely on his general knowledge and authoritative secondary sources for the historical background while using primary materials for the contemporary scene, albeit mostly in German translation. It should be mentioned that S. F. Young's translation of the book into English is a masterpiece of succinctness and clarity.

While lack of space precludes the details necessary to make any survey meaningful, some cogent facts might include the following: the USSR dangled the prospect of German unification before West Germany by using its ally, the German Democratic Republic as bait until 1955 when Bonn integrated with NATO, that Poland and Rumania enjoy greater autonomy because both are isolated from the West geographically, that while Czechoslovakia resented Russian intervention on August 21, 1968, it resented the U.S.S.R.'s use of German troops even more, that Hungary is once again considered the most «right of center» of all Warsaw Pact nations now that Czechoslovakia is whipped into line, and that Bulgaria, though relatively unimportant to Russia, enjoys most favored nation status with the U.S.S.R. and takes full advantage of it.

The format can be criticized in only minor details. But while the excellent table of contents coupled with the book's brevity perhaps precludes an index, a glossary of the numerous abbreviations would be most desirable both for the general reader and undergraduate students of limited background. Otherwise, it is interesting reading with the younger set as my classroom experience confirms.

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