Zeitspanne von 1821-1910 der Kern des ideologischen Inhalts des Griechentums."

The general conclusions reached by Mr. Korisis are convincing, as, for the first time, facts about the main characteristics of the political psychology of the Modern Greeks are given. But what makes this book important is not so much the final conclusions as the masterly fashion in which they were reached and the concise and well-documented information imparted in the process. What Mr. Korisis has done, while working out this particular theme, is that he has provided the student with a scholarly account of the political and social development of Modern Greece. His brilliant book serves a double purpose: it is a book for the historian since it deals with an aspect of the political and social Greek History hitherto not thoroughly studied: it is also a book for the general reader, for it provides a concise and well-documented account of a new state on its way to democracy. It makes available to historians information from numerous Greek and other sources which are set out in the excellent bibliography. Particularly valuable too are the Tables (pp. 49, 85, 112-119, 138-139 and 204-205) of statistical data referring to population, general elections, parliaments, and governments, as well as the parallel data of social and political development illustrating various portions of the text. It is therefore a book which should possess an important place in the bibliography of Modern Greek Studies.

Athens

DOMNA N. DONTAS


As soon as Mussolini seized power in his October 28 march on Rome in 1922, he started to try building up his new regime's prestige through actions in the realm of international politics. At Lausanne, however, he failed to reopen the question of the mandates, and at the London and Paris conferences he was not successful in his efforts to act as a mediator between Britain and France in the matter of German reparations. After these diplomatic setbacks, he redirected his desire to assert himself in the international arena toward a weaker sector in the international environment, and those in charge of his naval instruments of coercion began contemplating using techniques of power and force
in relations with Greece, which was then in the midst of the great turmoil generated by the defeat of the Greek armed forces in Anatolia in 1922. The Italian Fleet was thus recalled to Taranto late in July 1923, and Mussolini’s Minister of the Navy and Grand Admiral of the Italian Fleet lamented the decline of Italian prestige in the Adriatic. The reasons for this naval concentration were the worsening of relations with Greece over the cession to Italy, by Turkey, under the Treaty of Lausanne, of the Greek-inhabited Dodecanese islands, and the friction arising over the demarcation of the Greek-Albanian border which an international commission, set up by the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris and presided over by an Italian, General Enrico Tellini, was carrying out. Anti-Italian articles in the Athens press, the Italian Navy Minister, felt, had fomented public manifestations against Italy. The Greek government had done nothing to restrain the Greek journalists. In this “red-hot” atmosphere, he concluded, the formal proclamation of Italian sovereignty over the Dodecanese was sure to produce “an uproar and disorders of a provocative character.” Italy therefore should be ready to react “immediately and vigorously in an exemplary manner in order to obtain reparations,” because it was not inclined to “tolerate damages harmful to national dignity.” Naval threats should be made against Athens in the Aegean. In the Ionian sea Corfu should be occupied. Accordingly, the Italian government sent spies to that island and they reported that Corfu was defenseless. By the terms of the convention by which Britain had ceded the Ionian islands to Greece in 1864, Corfu had been neutralized. The Treaty of Lausanne which had altered this was to enter into effect only in February 1924.

Then, all of a sudden, what appears to have been from the Italian viewpoint an unpredictable event served as a god-sent pretext for using the Italian instruments of coercion along the lines planned for dealing with possible Greek manifestations provoked by the Athens press against the “national dignity” of Italy, on the occasion of the formal take-over of the Dodecanese. On August 27, General Tellini and all members of his staff were murdered near the Greek-Albanian border but on Greek territory. Two days later, the Italian government presented an ultimatum to the Greek government. On August 30 Athens rejected the ultimatum’s terms. Next day, Italian naval vessels bombarded and occupied Corfu.

With a great wealth of hitherto unpublished documents as well as through a number of interesting interviews, Mr. Barros in his excel-
lent case-study vividly recounts the whole complex process of international actions and reactions which the Italian General’s murder, the Italian ultimatum, and the occupation of Corfu triggered not only among the governments indirectly concerned but also among the leading European governments and also Japan, as well as in international institutions such as the Conference of Ambassadors and the Council of the newly established League of Nations, to which the Greek government had appealed.

Mr. Barros reveals how Mussolini resented any handling of the question by the League and, in behavior that foreshadowed his conduct during his aggression against Ethiopia about a decade later, threatened to leave the League if it insisted on its competence in the issue. With the aid of hitherto secret materials, Mr. Barros also discloses for the first time that the Conference of Ambassadors, that residual body of the pre-World War I Concert of Europe (plus Japan) and therefore the natural rival of the League Council, another heir of the Concert system, suppressed the report of its own Commission which had found by a three-to-one majority that Greece had employed the degree of diligence required by international law in its efforts to discover and punish the assassins and therefore could not be held responsible. Instead, the Conference, as is well known, did find Greece responsible, and required it to give Mussolini the fifty million lire ($2,270,000 in 1923) he had demanded as a price for the apprehension and punishment of the assassins or for withdrawal from Corfu.

All in all, Mr. Barros’ book illustrates clearly two problems of continuing importance in international law, namely the question of responsibility of a state for a political assassination in its territory, and the question of the legitimacy of resort to coercive techniques of state-manship through reprisals short of war. And, for students of world politics, this study highlights several important points. First, it shows how difficult it is for statesmen of great powers who simultaneously confront a great many important international questions among themselves to examine on its own merits an issue between one of their ilk and a small state. France, for example, at the time of the Corfu crisis did not wish to antagonize the Italian dictator because it needed his help in order to defend its occupation of the Ruhr Valley. Hence, its accommodating, appeasing attitude toward Mussolini’s blustering tactics. Second, this study emphasizes the relationship between diplomatic techniques and those that are based on power. Britain, for instance, at
first took a clear anti-Mussolinian stand in the matter and supported the League's competence to deal with the dispute, but quickly found it more prudent not to insist on this point, because, as Mr. Barros points out, at that moment of crisis, it had no effective naval forces available in the Mediterranean that might enable it to back its diplomacy with any sanction of power. Third, Mr. Barros' book shows how states use international organizations of the League type not only as a forum for publicizing their own viewpoint in a dispute and for mobilizing third parties in their favor but also as a meeting place for backstage probes, demarches, and negotiations with the opponent. Nicholas Politis, for instance, the Greek representative to the League of Nations, before the second private meeting of the League Council on September 1, approached his Italian opposite number, Antonio Salandra, and expressed the desire for a quick-settlement of the dispute through a direct bilateral agreement to which the Council would then easily give its formal approval.

In his conclusions, Mr. Barros dwells mainly on the point made by G. A. Graig and F. Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats: 1919-1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) about the conflict of viewpoints between diplomats nurtured in the pre-World War I traditions of the European international quasi-community, the norms of which were secrecy, courtesy, and compromise, and the new breed of European politicians exemplified by Mussolini and Hitler, who rose to power from a different social class than the diplomatic elite and who therefore behaved in ways that were alien to the traditional norms of international conduct. In this conflict, the diplomats were bound to lose, either by adapting themselves to the new styles of action or by resigning. Few civil servants took the latter course. Most were involved in what Julien Benda has called *la trahison des clercs*. But perhaps we should sympathize with them. The dictators not only tried to make sure that they enjoyed public support in their policies but also established for themselves a status superior even to that of permanent civil servants. For them, there was no retirement age. Hence, the diplomats and other civil servants could scarcely hope for a political change in the leadership in the foreseeable future—except through death or assassination. The "jelly-bowl" functions—or disfunctions—of diplomats in their relations with innovator political leaders had, in such circumstances, scant prospects of success.

An omission to be regretted in this multifaceted and otherwise
most comprehensive book is the lack of research in the Athens press for materials that Mussolini’s regime considered provocative and harmful to Italy’s “national dignity.” It may have cast interesting light on the whole atmosphere in Greek-Italian relations during the weeks that preceded Tellini’s assassination and would have highlighted the general question of the impact of a free press national system in international relations with another state, the press of which is government-controlled. Psychoanalysts of crime have suggested that sometimes the victim of a crime cooperates, as it were, with the criminal in the crime’s perpetration. As Mr. Barros’ book suggests, the Italians might have bombarded and occupied Corfu in 1923 even if Tellini and members of his staff had not been murdered at Kakavia, that fatal day of August 27, 1923. Would Greek government efforts to restrain the Athens press in their remarks about Italy have prevented such a happening? It should be noted that the revolutionary regime in Greece, because of the situation, was exerting at the time considerable control over the press in matters of its domestic concern. But this question is unanswerable. Aesop’s fable about the wolf and the lamb, however, suggests that, even if the Greek press organs had shown a sense of greater responsibility in commenting upon Italy’s activities, Mussolini’s prestige-building efforts at Greece’s expense might have gone on, albeit under less favorable circumstances.

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STEPHEN G. XTIDIS


This well-produced publication consists of 48 pages of introductory text and 76 pages of documents, the majority of which (Appendix XVI) consist of the reports of Karl von Gasser, the Bavarian representative in Athens, to King Ludwig I and to the Bavarian Foreign Minister, August von Gise. As Barbara Jelavich points out, these reports reflect a conservative and monarchical attitude towards the Greek Revolution of 1843 and also Gise’s suspicion of the hand of the Russian representative in Athens, A. G. Çatacazy, a Phanariote Greek, in the engineering of the revolt.